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Introduction
In this paper we consider the range of security techniques available to future designers and implementors of
telecommunications networks.  The primary focus of this paper will be mobile networks, which is where much
of the recent public effort on telecommunications security has been exerted.  However, the techniques described
are of general applicability in telecommunications.
Before proceeding we need to establish our terminology and, in particular, to define what we mean by a security
technique; in doing so we will distinguish between security features and security techniques (or security
mechanisms, as security techniques are often known).  Security provisions in systems are present, not for their
own sake, but to combat identified security threats.  To combat these threats requires the provision of specific
security features (sometimes known as services), such as
• confidentiality - to address the threat of unauthorised disclosure of information by means of eavesdropping,
etc.,
• data integrity - to address the threat of unauthorised modification to information,
• origin authentication - to address the threat of information being spuriously inserted into a network,
• entity authentication - to address the threat of one entity masquerading as another,
• non-repudiation - to address the threat of an entity repudiating its actions (i.e. denying actions it has taken).
These features exist as abstract concepts, and are independent of the means used to provide them.  Features are
provided by security techniques (or mechanisms), which include
• encipherment algorithms - used to help provide confidentiality features,
• integrity mechanisms - (which include the well-known MACs), used to help provide data integrity and origin
authentication features,
• digital signature algorithms -which can be used to help provide non-repudiation features,
• authentication exchanges - used to help provide entity authentication features.
At this point we should mention ISO 7498-2: 1989, which provides a standardised language for discussing
security features and techniques (or security services and mechanisms as ISO 7498-2 describes them).  We will
use the terminology defined in ISO 7498-2 wherever possible, although we prefer to use the term security
feature rather than security service to avoid confusion with services provided via a telecommunications network.
ISO 7498-2 defines a range of types of security feature, as well as a classification of security techniques, and
describes which techniques might be used to provide each of the defined security features.
In looking at techniques appropriate to telecommunications networks we will summarise the progress which has
been made in recent years in providing general-purpose standards for security techniques.  This work has
primarily taken place within ISO/IEC JTC1/SC27/WG2.
Security services
In order to put our discussion of security techniques into an appropriate context, it is first helpful to consider
what types of security feature are required in telecommunications networks.  To do this we first review the
security features provided in the current `second generation’ mobile telecommunications standards for GSM and
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DECT (produced by ETSI).  We then briefly review possible requirements for security features in future mobile
telecommunications networks.
In the GSM standards, the following security features are provided:
• confidentiality of user and signalling data passed across the air interface,
• confidentiality for the user identity when passed across the air interface, and
• entity authentication between a mobile and a base station (across the air interface).
The DECT standards provide a similar set of security features, i.e. they are also restricted to air interface
confidentiality and entity authentication.
Standards for future mobile telecommunications networks will almost certainly need to allow for the provision
of a wider range of security features; in addition, the security techniques specified in the GSM and DECT
standards may be inappropriate for future mobile networks.  Examples of additional security features which
might be supported in future mobile networks standards (ETSI UMTS and ITU-T FPLMTS) include:
• integrity for data passed across the air interface,
• end-to-end data confidentiality between mobiles,
• non-repudiation of charging information.
Of course, just because certain security features and supporting mechanisms are not specified in GSM, does not
mean that they cannot be provided in GSM networks.  However, because these features are not specified in the
standards, proprietary solutions are needed, which can impose considerable extra costs on Network Operators
in designing additional security facilities, and in commissioning their implementation in network equipment.
This means there is a considerable advantage, both to operators and manufacturers, in providing wider-ranging
security standardisation for future networks.
Security techniques
We now consider a range of types of security technique which are relevant to the provision of the types of
security feature we have discussed above.  In particular we consider the following categories of security
technique (note that some techniques can be used to help as components in other, more complex, techniques):
• encipherment techniques (for providing confidentiality features),
• integrity techniques (for providing data integrity features and as a building block in authentication
exchanges),
• digital signature techniques (for providing data integrity and non-repudiation features),
• hash-functions (used in conjunction with digital signatures and also as a means of building integrity
techniques), and
• authentication exchanges (for providing entity authentication features).
GSM and DECT make use of encipherment techniques (to provide air interface data confidentiality and user
identity confidentiality), integrity techniques (to help construct authentication exchanges), and authentication
exchanges (to provide entity authentication).
We now look at each of these categories of mechanism in a little more detail.
Encipherment techniques
No international standards exist for encipherment techniques, despite the US standardisation of the DES block
cipher algorithm some 15 years ago (ANSI X3.92-1981), and its subsequent adoption as a de facto standard by
the international banking community.  Instead work has focused on creating an international register of
encipherment algorithms, which will provide each registered algorithm with a unique name.  The form of
register entries, and the procedure for having entries added to the register, is standardised in ISO/IEC 9979:
1991.  The international Registration Authority is the NCC here in the UK
The GSM standards make use of a proprietary algorithm (called A5), which is owned by ETSI, and the details
of which are kept secret, and released only to authorised manufacturers who are obliged to sign non-disclosure
agreements.  The A5 algorithm is not currently on the register (as of November 1994 there were ten registered
algorithms), although there is no reason why it should not be, since registration of an algorithm does not require
any disclosure of the algorithm’s operation.  Given the status of international standardisation for encipherment
techniques, and the long-standing political sensitivity of encipherment technology, the GSM approach appears
to be the only sensible way ahead, and for the foreseeable future this appears to be the most appropriate means
for selection of encipherment techniques.
Before proceeding it is worth observing that, although there are no internal encipherment algorithm standards,
there is a standard governing ways in which a block cipher algorithm (such as DES) might be used.  This modes
of operation standard (ISO/IEC 10116: 1991), has evolved from the ANSI standard prescribing modes of use
for the DES block cipher (ANSI X3.106-1983).  However, this ISO/IEC standard is probably of limited
relevance to telecommunications networks, since high-speed stream ciphers rather than block ciphers are
probably appropriate for the majority of telecommunications networks (it is certainly true that A5 is a stream
cipher algorithm).
Integrity techniques
The purpose of a data integrity technique is to enable the recipient of a data string (protected using the
technique) to both verify its origin and that it has not been changed in transit.  Hence such a mechanism can be
used to provide both data integrity and origin authentication features.
Standards for integrity mechanisms date back to the early 1980s; ANSI has published two integrity mechanisms
for banking use (X9.9-1986 (revised) and X9.19-1985).  A corresponding international banking standard, ISO
8731-1: 1987, has subsequently been published.  All three of these standards specify use of the DES block
cipher algorithm in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) Mode to produce a Message Authentication Code (MAC).  A
different integrity mechanism, called the Message Authenticator Algorithm (MAA), is specified in the banking
standard ISO 8731-2: 1992 (second edition).  Following from the banking work, the international standard
ISO/IEC 9797: 1994 (second edition) for an integrity mechanism has been produced; this technique is also
based on the use of a block cipher in CBC mode.
The GSM and DECT standards do not support the provision of origin authentication or data integrity services.
However they both make use of an integrity mechanism as part of an authentication exchange technique which
supports entity authentication of a mobile to a base station (we discuss this further below).  Future
telecommunications networks may well wish to offer a data integrity service as an optional feature of service
provision; it is also highly possible that ISO/IEC 9797 will not be appropriate for use, as it requires the
implementation of a block cipher.  However, one-way hash-function algorithms are at an advanced stage of
standardisation (see below), and they can be simply adapted for use as integrity mechanisms, and this might
well provide a possible route for future telecommunications networks.  It certainly seems reasonable to suppose
that future network designers will wish, wherever possible, to user standardised cryptographic techniques rather
than design their own.
Finally it is important to note that, in parallel with the cryptographic check functions of the type described, the
general class of integrity mechanisms also includes non-cryptographic mechanisms which are vital to the
provision of integrity protection for sequences of data packets, for each of which an individual MAC or check-
value may be computed.  Examples of these non-cryptographic mechanisms include the use of sequence
numbers or timestamps to provide data integrity for entire sequences of packets against manipulation (including
threats such as duplication and deletion of entire packets).
Digital signature techniques
A digital signature technique is a function which, when applied to a data string, produces a result which enables
the recipient to verify the origin and integrity of a data string, i.e. it can be used to provide data integrity and
origin authentication features.  Moreover it has the property that only the originator of a data string can produce
a valid signature, i.e. being able to verify the correctness of a signature produced by an entity, does not provide
the means to compute that entity’s signature on any data string.  Digital signature techniques can be used to
provide non-repudiation of origin for a message, i.e. the recipient of a message with entity A’s signature on it,
has evidence that A sent the message which even A cannot repudiate.
Digital signature algorithms can be divided into two types.
• Digital signatures with message recovery - which have the property that the message can be recovered from
the signature itself; such signatures can normally only be applied to messages of limited length (e.g. of length
at most 500 bits).
• Digital signatures with appendix - where the message needs to be sent in parallel with the signature, and
signature acts as a `check’ on the separately transmitted message.
A technique of the first type has been standardised in ISO/IEC 9796: 1991.  The algorithm used is a variant of
the well-known RSA algorithm, the first and best known of the public key (or asymmetric) cryptographic
algorithms.
A US standard was recently published (the NIST Digital Signature Standard (DSS)) for a different signature
algorithm (a variant of the El Gamal signature algorithm), this time of the second, and more generally useful,
type.  This technique is almost certain to be included in an emerging ISO/IEC standard, which will contain
several techniques for Digital signatures with appendix.  In parallel with these `general purpose’ standards, US
and international banking standards committees have been developing standards incorporating the use of RSA
signatures.
It is therefore now possible to say that there are a variety of well-established signature techniques available.
However, they all share the same implementation difficulties (albeit to varying extents), namely that calculation
of a digital signature can be very computationally intensive.  This means that, until very recently, their
implementation in hand-portable telecommunications terminals has been impractical.  Smart cards capable of
performing digital signatures in a small fraction of a a second, which is what is needed, have proved difficult to
make at an economic price.
However, as soon as such devices can be made at or close to the price of current smart cards, the use of digital
signature techniques could become very attractive.  As well as providing all the features that a conventional
integrity mechanism, such as those built into GSM and DECT, can offer, key management for digital signature
techniques is significantly simpler, since verification keys need not be kept secret.  Moreover, digital signature
techniques enable the provision of non-repudiation features, which in turn makes telecommunications services
such as irrefutable charging and/or non-repudiable financial transactions a possibility.
One-way hash-functions
One-way hash-functions are an essential component of all digital signature with appendix techniques.  A hash-
function takes as input a data string of arbitrary length, and outputs a hash-code of some small fixed length
(e.g. 128 bits).  In the context of a digital signature with appendix technique, the message to be signed is first
input to a hash-function, and then the derived hash-code is input to the signature algorithm itself.  However,
hash-functions also have uses outside the context of digital signature algorithms.  One important characteristic
of hash-functions is that, unlike most other cryptographic functions, they do not use a secret key, and hence
their entire operation is typically public.
A multi-part international standard for one-way hash-functions (ISO/IEC 10118) is under development.  The
first two parts (ISO/IEC 10118-1: 1994 and ISO/IEC 10118-2: 1994) have now been published.  Part 1
contains general information, and Part 2 describes two methods for generating a hash-function from a block
cipher.
Part 3, for which publication is planned in 1996, specifies in complete detail two ‘dedicated’ hash-functions,
both designed specifically for the purpose.  One, known as SHS, is already the subject of a recently published
US NIST standard; it is designed to be used with the NIST DSS (signature) algorithm, although it is equally
applicable to other signature algorithms.  The other, known as RIPEMD, has been developed as part of the EU-
funded RIPE project; RIPEMD is itself an ‘improved’ version of MD4, a hash-function developed by RSA Inc.
Both of these algorithms are simple to implement in software, and can process data at high rates even on modest
microprocessors.
Part 4, also likely to be published in 1996, specifies a pair of hash-functions based on modular exponentiation.
The reason for designing such hash-functions is that some digital signature algorithms (e.g. RSA) are also based
on modular exponentiation, and hence a hash-function which could make use of the same arithmetic functions,
perhaps implemented in hardware, might be very advantageous.
Parts 3 and 4 are most likely to be of value in telecommunications networks, in particular either as part of a
digital signature algorithm, or as the basis of an integrity mechanism.  In fact it is very simple to use a hash-
function to produce an integrity mechanism; the data to be integrity protected is concatenated with a secret key,
and the resulting data string is input to the hash-function.  The hash-code output can then serve as a check-value
on the original data string, and, given the hash-function is itself cryptographically strong, the check-value for a
message can only be calculated by someone possessing the correct secret key.
Finally we note one other possible application for a one-way hash-function which may be of relevance to
telecommunications networks.  If a stored data object (e.g. a file) needs protection against change, it can be
input to a hash-function and the output stored in a secure place.  Recomputing the hash-code and comparing it
with the stored value can be used to verify the correctness of the stored data.  This is valuable in protecting
against malicious changes made by malicious entities or programs (e.g. viruses).
Authentication exchanges
Authentication exchange techniques (or authentication protocols as they often called) are exchanges of
cryptographically protected messages, which have the objective of enabling two communicating entities to
verify one another’s identity, i.e. they provide entity authentication features.  Entity authentication can only be
achieved for a single instant of time.  Typically these exchanges are used to initiate a secure connection, and
Session Keys may be established as a by-product of the authentication process.
In order for these authentication exchanges to work, some or all, of the messages need to be protected by a
cryptographic mechanism, typically either an encipherment mechanism, a digital signature or an integrity
mechanism.  In addition, non-cryptographic mechanisms (typically time-stamps or random ‘nonces’) need to be
included in the messages to guarantee that the messages are ‘fresh’.
The first standardised authentication exchanges were specified in CCITT X.509 (1988) (ISO 9594-8), which
contains three different protocols all based on digital signature techniques; a revised version of this ITU-T
Recommendation/ISO standard has recently been published.  Since then a multi-part standard ISO/IEC 9798
has been developed, containing a variety of different authentication exchange techniques using a range of
different underlying cryptographic mechanisms.
Part 1 (ISO/IEC 9798-1: 1991) contains a general model for techniques of this type.  Part 2 (ISO/IEC 9798-2:
1994) contains a set of authentication exchanges in which the messages are protected using an encipherment
technique.  Part 3 (ISO/IEC 9798-3: 1993) contains another set of authentication exchange techniques.  These
techniques are all based on the use of digital signature techniques to cryptographically protect the messages.
Yet another set of authentication exchange techniques, this time based on the use of integrity mechanisms, is to
be found in Part 4 (ISO/IEC 9798-4: 1995).  In each of Parts 2, 3 and 4, some of the exchanges are suitable for
use when synchronised clocks are available (and hence the messages contain time-stamps which can be used to
verify their ‘freshness’), and some use random or pseudo-random nonces (or challenges) instead.
The GSM and DECT standards both specify the use of authentication exchange mechanisms to provide entity
authentication services between a mobile and a base station (over the air interface).  In both cases, although the
mechanisms are slightly different, the mechanisms conform to techniques specified in ISO/IEC 9798-4, i.e. the
mechanisms are based on the use of integrity techniques.  In both cases freshness is guaranteed by the use of
pseudo-random nonces (challenges).  The integrity techniques used are in both cases based on secret proprietary
algorithms.
In both GSM and DECT the authentication exchanges are used at the start of a connection; they also provide
the basis of session key distribution systems.  The session key is subsequently used to encipher the data sent
over the connection.
The use of authentication exchanges is fundamental to the provision of security in any situation where a
communications link is liable to attack.  It is difficult to imagine any future mobile networks not employing such
a technique as a first line of defence against users wishing to fraudulently obtain service.  Authentication
exchanges may also be employed where different network operators an/or service providers need to verify one
another’s identity when they are collaborating to provide service to a user.
Finally it is also important to observe that authentication exchange techniques can be integrated with techniques
to provide user identity confidentiality based on the use of continually updated `temporary identities’.  Such
schemes already operate in GSM, and an elaborated version of the GSM and DECT schemes has recently been
proposed for adoption as a mechanism for use in FPLMTS.
Summary
We conclude this paper by observing that it should be clear that there already exist an increasingly wide range
of standardised security techniques of potential use in future telecommunications networks.  In the future the
existence of these standardised techniques may remove the need for the design of new techniques whenever a
new system is created.  In the medium term, and perhaps sooner than many experts would like, this may well
obviate the need for specialised cryptographers, at least as far as commercial communications are concerned!
The real need, both now and in the future, is for skilled staff capable of selecting, integrating and managing the
ever-increasing range of security products and systems available.
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